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NOTES
for marriage licenses to give proof, of parental consent or
majority, but no sanction exists for enforcing these articles. It
seems they could be enforced by imposing serious penalties or
punishments on licensing officers who violate the provisions.
Again, both parties to the marriage could well be required to
appear before the license issuing officer. Of course, if all public
officers and persons authorized to celebrate marriages made a
conscientious attempt to abide by the articles of the Civil Code,
penalties would not be necessary and problems as are herein
discussed would not be likely to arise.
EDwIN C. SCHIL NG, JR.
NATURAL OBLIGATIONS--SUFFICIENCY As CONSIDERATION-On
November 22, 1933, Burns transferred to his first wife certain
real and personal property in settlement of an indebtedness of
fifteen thousand dollars arising from the dissolution of the
community formerly existing between them. The transfer was
accepted as full satisfaction of the debt. Subsequent to a second
marriage, Burns and his first wife entered into a second agree-
ment rescinding the first, evaluating the property previously
transferred at six thousand dollars, transferring further property
to the amount of one thousand dollars, and acknowledging a
further indebtedness on his part of eight thousand dollars, for
which three mortgage notes were given as collateral security.
Burns died without making further payments on the debt. His
widow sued to bring the mortgage notes back into the succes-
sion on the theory that they were void for want of consideration.
The defense of the first wife was that the acknowledgment of
the indebtedness was supported by a natural obligation arising
from the fact that the value of the property transferred to her
by the first agreement was not equal to the amount of the debt.
The court held that the dation en paiement extinguished the
debt in toto, as a full payment in money, and that if any obliga-
tion remained because the value of the thing given was not
equal to the amount of the debt, it was not a natural obligation,
but a moral one, and not sufficient to support a new promise to
pay. Succession of Burns, 199 La. 1081, 7 So. (2d) 359 (1942).
father and mother or the survivor of them; and if they are both dead, the
consent of his tutor. He must furnish proof of this consent to the officer to
whom he applies for permission to marry."
14. Art. 98, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Those who have attained the age of
majority, on their demanding permission to marry, must furnish proof of
their having attained that age."
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Jurisprudence prior to the present case leaves in considerable
doubt the question of whether there can be under our laws any
natural obligations except those specifically enumerated in Arti-
cle 1758. The supreme court, in Succession of Miller v. Manhat-
tan Life Insurance Company,1 held the natural obligations so
enumerated to be exclusive. In In re Atkin's Estate,2 a federal
circuit court of appeals case, the enumerated natural obligations
were held merely illustrative. Beyond these cases, the courts,
expressly or impliedly, have frequently found natural obligations
in situations not among those enumerated in Article 1758. It has
been held that money repaid on a loan made at usurious interest
is not recoverable; 3 that a new promise to pay a debt discharged
in bankruptcy may be enforced;' that payment of an illegal or
unconstitutional tax cannot be recovered; 5 that a payment by a
contractor to reimburse the owner for whiskey which disap-
peared from a house which he was constructing is not recover-
able;6 that a voluntary payment of more than the contract price
cannot be recovered where the original price was harsh;7 that
the price paid for improvements on public land to one not in a
position to avail himself of preemption laws is not recoverable;8
1. 110 La. 652, 34 So. 723 (1903).
2. 30 F.(2d) 761 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929).
3. Perrtllat v. Puech, 2 La. 428 (1831); Rosenda v. Zabriskie, 4 Rob. 493
(La. 1843).
4. Blanc v. Banks, 10 Rob. 115 (La. 1845) (court did not mention natural
obligations); Bach v. Cohn, 3 La. Ann. 101 (1848) (promise held supported
by a moral obligation); Beck v. Howard, 3 La. Ann. 501 (1848) (where the
court held the promise supported by a moral obligation also spoken of as
a legal obligation). See Linton v. Stanton, 4 La. Ann. 401 (1849); Bartlett
v. Peck, 5 La. Ann. 669, 670 (1850); Glenn v. Dunbar's Administratrix, 10
La. Ann. 253, 255 (1855); Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 433, 21 So.(2d) 485,
488 (1945).
5. Campbell v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 34 (1857) (cites Art. 1751
(1), La. Civil Code of 1825); Factors and Traders Ins. Co. v. City of New
Orleans, 25 La. Ann. 454 (1873); Book v. City of Shreveport, 144 So. 145 (La.
App. 1932) (cites Art. 1758, La. Civil Code of 1870). Cf. Fusilier v. St. Landry
Parish, 107 La. 221, 31 So. 678 (1902) (where the court cited the above cases
with approval, but based its holding on estoppel); Lisso and Bro. v. Police
Jury of Parish of Natchitoches, 127 La. 283, 53 So. 566 (1910); Simpson v.
City of New Orleans, 133 La. 384, 63 So. 57 (1913); Louisiana Land and Im-
provement Co., Ltd. v. Police Jury of Grant Parish, 156 La. 849, 101 So. 241
(1924); Dupre v. City of Opelousas, 161 La. 272, 108 So. 479 (1926); City of
New Orleans v. Jackson Brewing Co., 162 La. 121, 110 So. 110 (1926); Crescent
City Bldg. & Homestead Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 141 So. 412 (La. App.
1932).
6. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Murphy, 163 So. 724 (La.
App. 1935) (cites Arts. 1757, 1758. La. Civil Code of 1870).
7. Jackson v. Ferguson, 2 La. Ann. 723 (1847) (cites Arts. 2280, 2281, La.
Civil Code of 1825).
8. Spurlin v. Millikin, 16 La. Ann. 217 (1861) (cites Art. 1758(1), La. Civil
Code of 1870).
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that the natural obligation of bank directors to replace the capital
stock of the bank precludes recovery of personal funds of the
directors so used;9 that a promise to indemnify a wife for
wounds inflicted on her husband is binding;0 ; that the new
promise to pay by an indorser, released from liability on a note
by an extension of time granted the maker, is enforceable; 1 that
a promise to remunerate a faithful servant for long service at low
wages is enforceable; 12 and that notes given by a father to
certain of his children are supported by a valid consideration in
the natural obligation to equalize his gifts to his children."
Notwithstanding such jurisprudence the present case held flatly
that the natural obligations enumerated in Article 1758 are
exclusive.
The French Civil Code does not define natural obligations;
our Articles 1757, 1758 and 1759 have no counterpart therein. The
only article in the French Civil Code dealing directly with the
subject is Article 1235, disallowing repetition of payments made
in response to a natural obligation. In practice, the French courts
take a rather broad view of natural obligations, generally finding
a natural obligation wherever a party acted in response to an
imperious duty of conscience and honor.14 When the drafters of
our Code came to the subject of obligations, they considered it
advisable to specifically enumerate the situations giving rise to
natural obligations.2 5 In addition, natural obligations were
clearly distinguished from moral obligations, which were said
to produce no effect whatsoever. 6 The purpose of the drafters in
so doing was clearly expressed as follows:
"Although this kind of obligation [moral obligation] has
no legal effect whatever, its definition is introduced because it
9. Interstate Trust and Banking Co. v. Irwin, 138 La. 325, 70 So. 313 (1915).
10. Beckley v. Clark, Administrator, 8 La. Ann. 8 (1853) (cites Arts. 1749,
1750(2), 1752(2), La. Civil Code of 1825).
11. Mortgage Investment, Inc. v. Natal, 181 La. 651, 160 So. 128 (1935)
(cites Arts. 1758, 1759, La. Civil Code of 1870).
12. Barthe v. Succession of Lacroix, 29 La. Ann. 326 (1877). Cf. Succes-
sion of Rabasse, 49 La. Ann. 1405, 22 So. 767 (1897).
13. In re Atkin's Estate, 30 F.(2d) 761 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929).
14. For general discussions of this subject, see .Supp. V Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie-Bonnecase, Trait6 de Droit Civil (1930) 217, § 111; 2 Colin et Capitant,
Cours 216mentaire Droit Civil Francais (8 ed. 1935) 265, § 275 (urging con-
trary view, but recognizing majority opinion); 4 Marcade, Explication The-
orique et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 541, § 669; 11 Planiol et Ripert,
Tralt6 Pratique de Droit Civil Francais (1932) 877, § 1517; 1 Pothier, Ouvres
(1830) 50, § 191.
15. Art. 1758, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Art. 1757, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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is frequently referred to by commentators and sometime with
such loose expressions, as might induce a belief that it had the
effect of a natural obligation, unless the contrary were de-
clared. In the common law of England, 'natural affection'
which is an imperfect obligation is a good consideration for a
conveyance. As we do not mean to sanction this principle, it
was the more necessary to declare it, because of the danger
of introducing from the jurisprudence of our sister states
principles inconsistent with that of our own."1"
This would indicate that the view taken in Succession of Miller
v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company,8 and reaffirmed in the
present case, is in accord with the legislative intent.19
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 recognizes two kinds of
contracts, as far as the motive for making them is concerned"-
gratuitous 21 and onerous.22  Gratuitous contracts include, in
addition to certain specific types not involving a diminution of
patrimony,2 8 pure liberalities, or donations. Because the donation
involves a diminution of patrimony of the donor without any-
thing being received in return, it is subject to certain special
requirements, notably the requirement that it must be in the
form of an authentic act.2 4
Presumably, a promise supported by a natural obligation
falls within the category of onerous obligations. It would seem
to follow, then, that a contract not onerous by definition and not
17. Louisiana Legal Archives, Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 (1937)
226, comment to Art. 1751(1).
18. 110 La. 652, 34 So. 723 (1903).
19. However, it has been noted that, contrary to the view expressed in
the Miller case, the courts have frequently found natural obligations in situ-
ations not among those enumerated in Article 1758, and there is reason to
believe that they will continue to do so. Commonwealth Finance Co. v. Liv-
ingston, 12 So.(2d) 44 (La. App. 1943), discusses the prior jurisprudence, and
expresses doubt as to whether the Miller case will be followed. In re Atkin's
Estate, 30 F.(2d) 761 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929), is approved; Succession of Burns
is not mentioned. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.(2d) 485 (1945) con-
tains dictum to the effect that a new promise to pay a debt discharged in
bankruptcy is supported by a natural obligation. Arts 1757, 1759, La. Civil
Code of 1870 are cited; Art. 1758 is not.
20. Art. 1772, La. Civil Code of 1870.
21. Art. 1773, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. Art. 1774, La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. Examples of this type of gratuitous contract are the deposit (Art.
2929, La. Civil Code of 1870), the sequestration (Art. 2975, La. Civil Code of
1870), the Loan for use or commodatum (Art. 2894, La. Civil Code of 1870),
and the loan for consumption or mutuum when not made at interest (Art.
2892, La. Civil Code of 1870).
24. Arts. 1536, 1538, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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supported by a natural obligation would be gratuitous. The result
of the adoption of a restrictive view of the theory of natural
obligations is therefore to bring within the category of donations
those contracts which rest upon an obligation not classifiable
as a natural obligation as enumerated in Article 1758.25 The use
of the authentic act would be essential to the validity of such
contracts."
Granting that it was competent for the court to find that a
natural obligation did not survive the original dation en paie-
ment, the subsequent acknowledgment of indebtedness would
constitute a gratuitous contract. This is but another way of
saying that it was intended as a disguised donation. The inquiry
would then follow whether it could be upheld as a donation.
From the record it appears that the second agreement, referred
to by the court as an "executed instrument" was in fact a con-
tract under private signature. Notwithstanding, therefore, that
the court did not seem to recognize the possibility of sustaining
the promise on the suggested basis, such an inquiry would have
led to the same result as that reached by the court. In short, the
decision is considered to be correct although the supporting
reasons were not definitive.
JOHN P. WOODLEY
PRIVILEGES ON OIL, GAS, AND WATER WELLS-ACT 232 OF
1916-ACT 68 OF 1942-Plaintiffs furnished materials used in the
drilling of two oil wells for the defendants. Upon failure of the
contractor to pay for the materials, the plaintiff sought to attach
defendants' producing well, asserting a privilege under Act 232
of 1916.1 The defendants had not recorded the bond required
by the act, and the plaintiff contended that the failure to file the
bond rendered the defendants liable for the value of the supplies
25. The Civil Code, of course, recognizes certain kinds of gratuitous
contracts that are not treated as donations. The French call such contracts
contrats ddsinetrdsses. See Note 22, supra, for illustrations of this type of
gratuitous contract. For discussion, see 2 Colin et Capitant, Drolt Civil
Francals (ed. 1935) 13, § 12.
26. This theory accounts for the number of decisions sustaining simu-
lated acts of sale as donations where the transfer was in the form of an
authentic act: Holmes v. Patterson, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 693 (1818); Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 10 La. 85 (1836); D'Orgency v. Droz, 13 La. 382 (1839); S~m~re v.
Sdmbre, 12 La. Ann. 681 (1856); Wolf v. Wolf, 12 La. Ann. 529 (1857); Harper
v. Pierce, 15 La. Ann. 666 (1860); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924,
3 So. 62 (1887); Reinerth v. Rhody, 52 La. Ann. 2029, 28 So. 277 (1900); Nof-
singer v. Hinchee, 199 So. 597 (La. App., 1941). Semble Haggerty v. Corri, 5
La. Ann. 433 (1850).
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5091-5097.
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